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Abstract
In [7] Hertwig et al. draw a distinction between deci-
sions from experience and decisions from description.
In a decision from experience an agent does not have a
summary description of the possible outcomes or their
likelihoods. A career choice, deciding whether to back
up a computer hard drive, cross a busy street, etc.,
are typical examples of decisions from experience. In
such decisions agents can rely only of their encoun-
ters with the corresponding prospects. By contrast,
an agent furnished with information sources such as
drug-package inserts or mutual-fund brochures—all of
which describe risky prospects—will often make deci-
sions from description.
In [7] it is shown (empirically) that decisions from ex-
perience and decisions from description can lead to
dramatically different choice behavior. Most of these
results (summarized and analyzed in [6]) are con-
cerned with the role of risk in decision making. This
article presents some preliminary results concerning
the role of uncertainty in decision making. We focus
on Ellsberg’s two-color problem and consider a chance
setup based on double sampling. We report empirical
results which indicate that decisions from description
where subjects select between a clear urn, the chance
setup based on double sampling and Ellsberg’s vague
urn, are such that subjects perceive the chance setup
at least as an intermediate option between clear and
vague choices (and there is evidence indicating that
the double sampling chance setup is seen as opera-
tionally indistinguishable from the vague urn). We
then suggest how the iterated chance setup can be
used in order to study decisions from experience in
the case of uncertainty.
Keywords. decisions from description, decisions
from experience, random selection, uncertainty
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which a well-educated couple
must decide whether or not their child should receive
a particular vaccination. To assist in their decision
making, the couple is provided with statistics con-
cerning the frequency of serious, adverse reactions as-
sociated with the vaccination in question. Though
the frequency of such adverse reactions is quite low,
the couple is reluctant to have their child vaccinated.
Concerned, the child’s pediatrician provides reasons
in favor of vaccination, noting that she herself in fact
had chosen to vaccinate her own children. What
might explain the difference between the judgement
of the child’s parents and that of the child’s pedia-
trician? One plausible explanation that is of general,
theoretical interest focuses on the way in which the
relevant parties are acquainted with the chances as-
sociated with an adverse reaction. While the child’s
parents are provided with frequencies, and presum-
ably the child’s pediatrician is privy to this informa-
tion, the pediatrician can also draw upon her own
clinical experience.
Hertwig et al. propose to analyze cases of this type
in terms of a distinction between decisions from de-
scription and decisions from experience. As suggested
by the scenario in the previous paragraph, which is
among the scenarios that provide motivation for the
work reported in [7], decisions from description are
made with the benefit of a description of the rele-
vant chance mechanism, e.g., associated probabilities,
while decisions from experience are informed by re-
peated encounters with the chance mechanism itself,
i.e., sampling. As noted in [7], the vast majority of
experimental work on decision making has focused on
decisions from description. The following example,
taken from Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 classic on
prospect theory [8], illustrates the methodology typi-
cal among work in this area:
Example 1. Which of the following do you prefer?
Alternative 1 pays $5000 with probability .001 and $0
with probability .999. Alternative 2 pays $5 with prob-
ability 1.
Is there any reason to think that this focus on de-
cisions from description has been significant with re-
spect to the results gathered through numerous stud-
ies which employ the sort of methodology illustrated
in Example 1? In [7], Hertwig et al. answer this ques-
tion in the affirmative. Specifically, they present ev-
idence indicating that people tend to “underweight
the probability of rare events” when making decisions
from experience. This is in stark contrast to the well-
known results of Kahneman and Tversky, based on
items such as Example 1, which indicate that people
tend to overweight the probability of rare events when
making decisions from description. Thus, it seems
that Hertwig et al. have isolated an important psy-
chological effect. The opening scenario clearly illus-
trates the effect Hertwig et al. have isolated. The
child’s parents are presented with frequencies which
they interpret as a description of the relevant chance
mechanism. As predicted by Hertwig et al., the child’s
parents overweight the probability of an adverse re-
action and decide not to vaccinate. By contrast, the
pediatrician’s decision making is informed by her clin-
ical experience. As predicted by Hertwig et al., the
child’s physician underweights the probability of an
adverse reaction and recommends vaccination.
Hertwig et al. restrict their attention to decision mak-
ing under risk. In particular, the descriptions that
they employ include a numerically precise probabil-
ity distribution. The main purpose of this paper
is to begin an investigation into the possibility of a
description-versus-experience effect in the context of
decision making under uncertainty, i.e., in contexts
where the description of the relevant chance setup
does not determine a numerically precise probability
distribution. On the basis of experimental evidence
reported in this paper we conjecture that the gap be-
tween vague and clear is less pronounced in the case of
decisions from experience than in the case of decisions
from description.
2 From Risk to Uncertainty
Consider the design of the first study reported by Her-
twig et al. in [7]. The subjects were divided into two
groups: Description and Experience. Those in De-
scription were presented with several choice problems,
each of which consisted of a pair of risky alternatives.
For example, one such choice problem consisted of the
alternatives (4, .8) and (3, .1), where (m, p) denotes
the risky alternative that pays amount m with prob-
ability p and pays amount 0 with probability 1− p.
Let (m, p) be a risky alternative of the indicated sort.
One can construct a chance setup that satisfies de-
scription (m, p). For example, a chance setup for the
alternative (4, .8) could use random draws (with re-
placement) from an urn consisting of 80 black balls
and 20 white balls. The implementation of the sec-
ond group, Experience, is less familiar. Consider
a decision-from-experience counterpart to the choice
problem consisting of (4, .8) and (3, .1). One could,
for example, present the subject with two buttons,
say A and B, where pressing A (B) results in a trial
on a particular chance setup corresponding to (4, .8)
((3, .1)). The subject, who sees the result of each trial
(e.g., in the case of A, whether the payoff would have
been 4 or 0), is permitted to sample the two chance
setups as many times as they wish before they are re-
quired to make a choice and play one of the two setups
for real payoffs. Essentially, this is the way in which
Hertwig et al. study decision making from experience.
What happens when we move from risk to uncertainty
(where probabilities are imprecise)? The obvious can-
didate on the description side is familiar through the
presentation of Ellsberg problems such as following:
Example 2 (Ellsberg’s two-color problem [4]). Con-
sider the following two cases:
Urn A contains exactly 100 balls. 50 of these balls are
solid black and the remaining 50 are solid white.
Urn B contains exactly 100 balls. Each of these balls is
either solid black or solid white, although the ratio
of black balls to white balls is unknown.
Consider now the following questions: How much
would you be willing to pay for a ticket that pays $55
($0) if the next random selection from Urn A results
in black (white) ball? Repeat then the same question
for Urn B.
Following the above presentation, an uncertain al-
ternative over a pair of prizes (only one of which is
nonzero) can be specified by providing the amount
of the nonzero prize and the set of probabilities that
are associated with that prize. Thus, for example,
(55, { i100 | 0 ≤ i ≤ 100}) is the uncertain alternative
in which the probability of winning $55 is known to
be in { i100 | 0 ≤ i ≤ 100}.
Presenting alternatives in this way has the virtue of
generalizing the risky alternatives that are employed
by Hertwig et al., since these risky alternatives are
simply those of the form (m, {p}). However, once
the probabilities are allowed to be indeterminate, it is
not clear how to complete the analogy in a way that
would support decision from experience under uncer-
tainty. Recall the desired relationship in the case of
risk. Given a risky alternative, e.g., (m, {p}), one can
construct a corresponding chance setup, i.e., one that
satisfies description (m, {p}). Doing the analogous
thing in the case of uncertainty would seem to require
chance setups that implement indeterminate probabil-
ities. Are there such things in any interesting sense?
After all, the uncertainty described in Ellsberg-type
examples is purely epistemic, e.g., the ratio between
black ball and white balls in Urn B is determinate
even though it is not known to the decision maker.
On the other hand, consider the following description
of a chance setup:
B∗: First, select an integer between 0 and 100 at ran-
dom, and let n be the result of this selection.
Second, make a random selection from an urn
consisting of exactly 100 balls, where n of these
balls are solid black and 100− n are solid white.
As in the case of Urn B, the outcome of a trial on
chance setup B∗ depends on a random selection from
an urn such that the ratio of black balls to white balls
is not known to the subject. However, unlike the case
of Urn B, the subject knows that the urn that is sam-
pled in the second stage of B∗ is determined by a
random selection in the first stage of B∗. According
to at least one familiar line of reasoning, this second
consideration suggests that a play on B∗ is equivalent
to a play on Urn A, rather than Urn B. The indicated
line of reasoning is roughly as follows: The random se-
lection in the first stage entails that, for each integer
i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 100, there is a probability of 1101 that
the urn sampled in the second stage consist of i black
balls and 100− i white balls. Moreover, according to
this line of reasoning the random selection in the sec-
ond stage entails that if i is selected in the first stage,
then the probability of selecting a black ball in the
second stage is i100 . This line of reasoning then con-
tinues by combining the first and second stage prob-
abilities to conclude that the probability of getting a
black ball on a trial of B∗ is 1101 (
∑100
i=0
i
100 ) =
1
2 , as in
the case of Urn A. There are, of course, well-known
responses to this line, the most obvious being one that
questions the relevance of a chance setup’s long-run
behavior when it comes to assigning probabilities for a
single trial of the setup; here we are assuming that the
relevant probabilities are based on frequencies rather
than something like propensities.
A less familiar response maintains that one has com-
plete uncertainty over the collection of chance setups
that satisfy description B∗ and that, since some of
the setups will select a black ball on their next trial
while others will select a white ball, one has complete
uncertainty with respect to the outcome of the next
trial. For example, even if one maintains that there
are truly nondeterministic chance setups, determin-
istic chance setups are common and are of the sort
that Hertwig et al. employ in [7]. If random selection
is understood to mean selection by a mechanism such
that (1) future behavior of the mechanism cannot be
predicted from a mere knowledge of its past behavior
and (2) the various possible outcomes are distributed
evenly in the long run – and these are important mat-
ters that will be considered in the sections that follow
– then the description of B∗ is compatible with the
use of such deterministic mechanisms.
For all the subject knows, the first stage selection in
B∗ can be made according to a deterministic process
that will select 33 on its next run, while the second
stage mechanism will be made according to a deter-
ministic mechanism that will select a black ball on its
next draw from the 33:77 urn. Similarly, it is compat-
ible with the information that is presented to the sub-
ject that the first stage selection in B∗ will be made
according to a deterministic process that will select
61 on its next run, while the second stage mechanism
will be made according to a deterministic mechanism
that will select a white ball on its next draw from the
61:39 urn. The subject has complete uncertainty over
these selection mechanisms and, more generally, over
the collection of all chance setups that might be used
to carry out the selections in B∗. Since the final out-
come, i.e., the selection of a black or white ball, is a
function of the chance setups which are employed, at
least where deterministic mechanisms are used, com-
plete uncertainty over the collection of these mecha-
nisms suggests complete uncertainty with respect to
the final outcome. Note that this line is rather ex-
treme, since it suggests complete uncertainty even in
situations where the second stage urn is fixed, e.g., as
in a chance setup that makes selections with replace-
ment from Urn A. Rather than trying to achieve con-
sensus with respect to such a priori considerations,
we now turn our attention to psychological matters.
3 Study
What is the psychological relationship between the de-
scription of Urn B and B∗? To investigate this ques-
tion we asked subjects to state their maximum buying
prices with respect to hypothetical situations involv-
ing the descriptions at issue. Our study included 89
undergraduates from Carnegie Mellon. At the time of
the study the participating students were enrolled in
80-100, an introductory philosophy course at Carnegie
Mellon. Each subject was presented with a question-
naire, the contents of which will now be described.
After instructing the subjects that they would be pre-
sented with questions involving hypothetical scenar-
ios, the questionnaire continued with the following tu-
torial on chance setups:
Think of a roulette wheel of the sort that
one would find in any American casino. The
casino employee spins the wheel in one di-
rection and then sends a ball in the other
direction along a track that goes around the
circumference of the wheel. Eventually the
ball comes to rest in one of the wheel’s 38
pockets. Players expect that this setup is
fair in the sense that the following conditions
are satisfied: (1) In the long run the number
of times that the ball lands in a particular
pocket is equal to the number of times that
the ball lands in any other particular pocket
and (2) One cannot predict where the ball
will land on the next spin simply by know-
ing where the ball landed on previous spins.
Roulette wheels are a special case of a more
general class of systems. More generally, a
chance setup is a system that includes a fi-
nite set {o1, ..., on} of possible outcomes and
that outputs one of these outcomes each time
that it is run. Such a chance setup is fair
just in case the following conditions are sat-
isfied: (1) If the system were run repeatedly,
then in the long run the number of trials that
would result in outcome oi would be equal to
the number of trials that would result in out-
come oj and (2) One cannot predict which
outcome will result from the next run of the
system simply by knowing the outcome of
each of the previous runs of the system.
The questionnaire then continued by instructing the
subjects that “random selection” in the context of the
questionnaire is to be understood as selection via a
fair chance setup. This instruction was followed by
three questions:
1. An urn has been filled with exactly 100 balls. 50
of the balls are black and the remaining 50 are
white. A random selection from the urn will be
made. What is the most that you would be
willing to spend on a ticket that pays $55
if the random selection results in a black
ball and pays $0 if the random selection
results in a white ball?
2. Consider the following two-stage process: (1)
A random selection is made from the collection
{0, 1, ..., 100} and (2) A second random selec-
tion is made from an urn that contains exactly
n black balls and 100− n white balls, where n is
the result of the random selection from the first
stage. Thus, for example, if 23 was the result
of the random selection in the first stage, then
the random selection in the second stage would
be from an urn containing exactly 23 black balls
and 77 white balls. What is the most that
you would be willing to spend on a ticket
that pays $55 if the random selection in
the second stage results in a black ball and
pays $0 if the random selection in the sec-
ond stage results in a white ball?
3. An urn has been filled with exactly 100 balls.
Each ball in the urn is either black or white. How-
ever, the ratio of black balls to white balls in the
urn is unknown. A random selection from the
urn will be made. What is the most that you
would be willing to spend on a ticket that
pays $55 if the random selection results in
a black ball and pays $0 if the random se-
lection results in a white ball?
Note that the ticket is played against the “clear”
chance setup in the first question, against the “double
sampling” chance setup in the second question, and
against the “vague” chance setup in the third ques-
tion. Thus, referring back to Example 2, the first of
these questions asks the subject to price the ticket
on Urn A, while the second asks the subject to price
the ticket with respect to B∗, and the third asks the
subject to price the ticket on Urn B.
Recognizing that the order in which the questions ap-
peared might affect the responses, we created three
different versions of the questionnaire: CDV, VDC,
and DVC. Version CDV was administered to 41 sub-
jects and presented the questions in the order given
above, i.e., the question concerning the clear setup fol-
lowed by the question concerning the double-sampling
setup followed by the question concerning the vague
setup. Version VDC, which was administered to 32
subjects, reversed this order. Version DVC was given
to 16 subjects and had the question about double-
sampling occurring first, the question about the vague
setup occurring second and the question about the
clear chance setup occurring third. In each version,
subjects were instructed to answer the questions in
the order that they were presented.
For each of the three groups, Table 1 shows the mean
maximum buying price for the three questions. Thus,
for example, the first row of the second column indi-
cates that, in the case of the ticket on the clear chance
setup, $22.68 was the mean maximum buying price for
the group of subjects that received the VDC version
of the questionnaire.
Question CDV mean VDC mean DVC mean
Clear 22.89 22.68 19.02
Double 14.68 9.77 7.70
Vague 5.82 7.10 3.25
Table 1
While the order of the questions appears to have had
some bearing, the basic pattern of Vague < Double
< Clear for the mean maximum buying prices seems
robust across the three versions of the questionnaire.
The mean maximum buying prices over all subjects
are shown in Table 2.
Question Mean
Clear 22.12
Double 11.66
Vague 5.82
Table 2
If we turn our attention to the level of individual sub-
jects, then the above pattern of strict inequalities is
less pronounced since approximately 13 of the subjects
gave the same maximum buying price for Double and
Vague; moreover, these subjects were not distributed
evenly across the three groups. However, as shown in
Table 3, a clear pattern emerges if we weaken the first
inequality.
Group # V ≤ D < C % V ≤ D < C
CDV 29 71%
VDC 24 75%
DVC 12 75%
All 65 73%
Table 3
The first column of Table 3 shows the number of sub-
jects in each group (and overall) that satisfied the
Vague ≤ Double < Clear pattern, while the second
column shows the associate percentages. As Table 3
shows, these percentages are quite stable across the
three groups individually and their union. It is also
worth noting that, as shown in Table 4, relatively few
of the subjects gave the same maximum buying price
for Clear and Double.
Group # C = D % C = D
CDV 12 29%
VDC 6 19%
DVC 4 25%
All 22 25%
Table 4
The first column of Table 4 shows the number of sub-
jects in each group (and overall) that gave the same
maximum buying price for Clear and Double, while
the second column shows the associate percentages.
The data also reveal as well an interesting result if
we consider the values for Vague, Double, and Clear
given by the mean maximum buying prices for VDC,
DVC and CDV, respectively. These values are impor-
tant because these are the results for the three cases
without considering comparisons – subjects were in-
structed to answer the questions sequentially and not
to return to previous questions. For example, since
Vague occurs first in VDC, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that it is evaluated in a non-comparative con-
text. Table 5 shows the mean maximum buying prices
for these three non-comparative cases:
Question Mean
Clear 22.89
Double 7.70
Vague 7.10
Table 5
These results suggest an operational identification of
Vague and Double, which have almost identical val-
ues; this is of interest to us since Double, unlike
Vague, seems to be implementable in a way that could
support decisions from experience, and this is some-
thing that we will revisit in the following section.
Furthermore, these values for Vague and Double are
clearly separated from the mean maximum buying
price for Clear as reported in Table 5. Perhaps the
only concern here is that the number of subjects who
received VDC is low in comparison to the number
of subjects in the other two groups. We expect to
run a larger experiment including decisions from ex-
perience. In this case it would be interesting to see
whether the pattern verified in the pilot is robustly
maintained.
Another issue that we intend to address in future
experiments concerns the worry, expressed by one
anonymous referee, that the complexity of B∗ rather
than its status with respect to uncertainty is respon-
sible for its lower price. This raises two interesting
issues. First, how might we control for this in future
experiments? Perhaps one way to do this would be to
have the subjects explain the reasoning behind their
responses. We can certainly ask the subjects why they
priced one alternative lower than another. The sec-
ond issue concerns the relationship between complex-
ity and uncertainty. In the present context this seems
to line up with the familiar distinction between impre-
cision and indeterminacy. One might claim that the
credal probabilities in the case of B∗ are imprecise
but not indeterminate, e.g. that the rational agent is
committed to a particular credal probability but is
unable identify that particular distribution. This sort
of situation is not unlike the imprecision that arises
in connection with the measurement of physical con-
cepts, e.g. length or weight. In contrast, one might
claim that in the case of Urn B the rational agent’s
credal probability itself – rather than just its estima-
tion of that credal probability – ought to be indeter-
minate. Surely the distinction is not mere stipulation,
but what is wrong with maintaining that the rational
agent’s credal probabilities with respect to B∗ should
also be indeterminate (i.e. that the rational agent is
not committed to a determinate credal probability in
such a case)? It seems that considerations of this sort
lead in the direction of bounded rationality, in partic-
ular the tenability of capacity independent notions of
rationality.
4 Discussion
The results of our study suggest that double sampling
is perceived as something in between risk and uncer-
tainty when comparative contexts are allowed, but is
there a way to make this intermediate position more
transparent? Perhaps one way to do this would be to
describe a mixed chance setup in which the subject
is told that the selection will be made from Urn A
with probability p and from Urn B with probability
1 − p. One could then attempt to identify the value
of p at which the subject’s maximum buying price is
equal to the maximum buying price that the subject
stated with respect to B∗. The value of p so identified
could be taken as a representation of the intermediate
position that B∗ occupies between risk (Urn A) and
uncertainty (Urn B).
One drawback to using descriptions of mixed chanced
setups in the manner suggested above is that such
descriptions do not appear to fit, at least psychologi-
cally, into the sets-of-probabilities approach to repre-
senting credal states. While the set of all distributions
p such that p(Black) = λp1(Black)+(1−λ)p2(Black),
where p1 ∈ X and p2 ∈ Y might seem like a natural
representation of a mixture with probability λ on X
and probability 1− λ on Y , some preliminary results
reported in [2] suggest that this is not the case.
If descriptions of double sampling are perceived as
something distinct from risk, what might an imple-
mentation of such a description look like in a study
of decision making from experience? Recall the study
by Hertwig et al. in [7]. They implemented the de-
scription of a risky alternative, such as (m, p), as an
appropriate chance setup. A trial on this chance setup
is activated by a button on a computer screen. After
pushing this button, the subject sees the outcome of
the trial on the computer screen. If we attempt to im-
plement B∗ in such a way that the subject sees only
the final result of the two-stage process after pushing
the appropriate button, then we run into problems.
The issue is that there is nothing to guarantee that
such an implementation of B∗ could not just as well
serve as an implementation of Urn A. By assumption,
a chance setup that satisfies B∗ will, in the long run,
draw j in the first stage approximately 1101 th of the
time. Moreover, in the long run, trials in which j is
drawn in the first stage result in the selection of a
black ball approximately j100 th of the time. Hence,
in the long run, ( 1101 )(
j
100 )th of the trials result in a
black ball drawn from the urn having j black balls
and 100 − j white balls. Thus, in the long run, ap-
proximately
(
1
101
)(
1
100
)
100∑
j=0
j =
5050
10100
=
1
2
of the trials result in the draw of a black ball, which
agrees with the limiting frequencies for an implemen-
tation of Urn A. If we assume that such an implemen-
tation of B∗ would also satisfy the condition that fu-
ture behavior cannot be predicted solely from a knowl-
edge of past behavior, and this seems to be a psycho-
logical matter, then it appears that there is nothing
to prevent such an implementation of B∗ from serv-
ing as an implementation of Urn A. Clearly the im-
plementations of B∗ and Urn A must be distinct in a
meaningful way if one is to conduct the desired study
of decision making from experience. We now consider
other proposals for implementing B∗.
One way to avoid the sort of problematic collapse dis-
cussed at the end of the previous paragraph would be
to make both stages of the double sampling visible to
the subject. Thus, for example, pressing the appro-
priate button on a computer screen for the first time
would run the the first-stage selection, and the result
of that selection would be shown to the subject, e.g.,
that the urn with 35 black balls and 65 white balls
had been selected. Pressing the button for the second
time would initiate a draw from the urn that had been
selected, and the result of that second-stage selection
would then be shown to the subject, e.g., that a white
ball had been drawn. Making both stages of double
sampling visible to the subject avoids the problematic
collapse since such an implementation of B∗ no longer
qualifies an an implementation of Urn A.
However, there is a possible objection to this design,
based on the fact that it implements a sort of hy-
brid experimental condition that does not correspond
purely to decisions from experience or decisions from
description. Typically in decisions from experience
the subjects do not have access to the probabilities
of the option considered. In the previous design one
makes at least intermediate (i.e., first stage) proba-
bilities explicit by revealing the composition of the
selected urn.
There is a remedy to the previous objection via the
implementation of the following experimental design.
This design assumes that the following four buttons
are available to the subject: PLAY, SELECT GAME,
V, and C. The subject’s initial choice concerns V and
C. Button C implements the “clear” scenario that was
presented in the questionnaire . If C is selected, then
the agent can press PLAY repeatedly. Pressing PLAY
samples from the implementation of the clear urn.
While the urn structure is hidden from the subject,
the subject sees the associated payoffs, $55 if black
and $0 if white, after each pressing of PLAY. If V is
selected, then the subject is instructed to press SE-
LECT GAME. Unbeknownst to the subject, pressing
SELECT GAME selects an implementation based on
one of the 101 possible urns considered above (i.e., an
urn consisting of n black balls and 100−n white balls
for some n ≤ 100).
The following algorithm is used to select a game: con-
sider the space of all possible ordered sequences of 101
urns. Then a sequence in this space is selected at ran-
dom and fixed. When the game starts and the agent
presses SELECT GAME for the first time the first
urn in the sequence is selected. Say that the subject
has pressed SELECT GAME n times. Then when
he presses SELECT GAME once more the selection
mechanism picks the urn in the n+ 1 position in the
sequence and samples it every time that PLAY is se-
lected. Now at each point the probability of white
or black will depend on the previous actions of the
subject playing the game. Since probabilities should
not be attributed to acts these probabilities remain
indeterminate.When the sequence terminates the al-
gorithm starts again at the initial point of the selected
sequence.
It is important to remark that what does not have a
determinate probability is the color of the first ball
prior to selecting or not a game (i.e. prior to choosing
to play). Likewise for the probability of the nth ball
prior at the moment of the choice whether or not to
select a game for the nth time. After the agent selects
a game (i.e. after the agent decides to play the game)
we have a uniform precise probability over the 101
configurations of the urn.
In addition after selecting games a few times and sam-
pling them the calculation of the probabilities of the
color of the ball in the next trial grows ever more com-
plicated after conditioning on what has been done and
on what has been seen from past plays of the game.
Even for an ideal agent these probabilities will be im-
precise. The agent will have bounds of the values
of the probabilities or he can form qualitative judg-
ments comparing probabilities but the agent will not
have precise probabilities at his disposal. So, under a
normative point of view there is indeterminacy at the
moment contemporary to the selection of the game,
and after a few trials there will be imprecision in the
corresponding probabilities.
When we consider bounded agents the situation is
even worse. The agent might not remember well what
he did in the past and what he saw in the past and
we can have recency effects as well. So, in the real
situation we have to deal with imprecise probabilities
and choices under uncertainty.
After SELECT GAME is pressed the subject has a
choice: explore the game that was selected by press-
ing PLAY or select a (possibly) new game by pressing
SELECT GAME. Pressing PLAY samples from the
current game. While the urn structure of the game is
hidden from the subject, the subject sees the associ-
ated payoffs, $55 if black and $0 if white, after each
pressing of PLAY. The agent can interact with the
two buttons as long as he wants. Notice that it is per-
fectly possible that an agent selects a game and then
presses PLAY repeatedly without selecting any other
game. Notice that in this case the argument in terms
of frequencies fails (the agent does not see data from
all urns, he just considers a single (or a few) urns).
So, the shift to the design where the two stages are
visible is essential in order to avoid the argument for
the collapse into urn A.
Example 3. A possible session involving V:
The subject first presses V.
On screen: Select a game by pressing SELECT GAME.
OR EXIT
The subject presses SELECT GAME.
On screen: You have been awarded a game. You can
play this game by pressing PLAY.
The subject presses PLAY and a payoff appears, for
example:
On screen: You won $55.
The subject then agent faces the choice of pressing
PLAY again or pressing SELECT GAME or EXIT
(in which case he faces the election of V and C again).
If the agent chooses instead button C, he will have the
option of pressing PLAY as many times as he wants.
A payoff will appear each time that PLAY is pressed.
At any time he can STOP and choose between V and
C.
Example 4. A possible session involving C:
The subject first presses C.
On screen: Press PLAY.
The subject presses PLAY and a payoff appears, for
example:
On screen: You won $0.
The subject will can press PLAY as many times as
he wants. A payoff will appear after each time that
PLAY is pressed.
After receiving feedback from these two buttons the
agent has to select V or C and in this case he will play
for real money. Of course, if he selects V a new game
will be selected by pressing SELECT GAME and he
will receive the payoff determined by the next pressing
of PLAY, i.e., by sampling the urn corresponding to
the current game.
This design makes visible the two-stage nature of the
V button but, as in the case of decisions from expe-
rience for risk, the agent does not receive any infor-
mation about intermediate probabilities. Notice that
the algorithm used in the proposed implementation
of decisions from experience is a particular instance
of a selection via a fair chance set up (as described to
subjects in the tutorial). Since it is clear that in this
case there is no collapse of the implemented mech-
anism with the clear urn, it follows that in general
there is no reason to expect a collapse of B∗ and C.
This shows that the operational identification of the
V and B∗ conditions might not just be attributable
to a statistical error on the part of the subjects.
We conjecture that this design of decisions from ex-
perience will also avoid an identification of the V and
C conditions. We also conjecture nevertheless that
the gap between the V and C conditions (buttons
in decisions from experience) will not be as severe
between the gap between the corresponding “vague”
condition and the “clear” conditions in the case of de-
cisions from description. This is because it is unlikely
that the subject encounters rare events while obtain-
ing feedback by interacting with button V, and this
suggests that the subject will remain ignorant of their
existence (examples of extreme values or rare events
will be the case where either Black or White are zero
or very low in the sampled urns).
We conjecture therefore that this proposal will show a
significant difference between decisions from descrip-
tion and decisions from experience, demonstrating
that the distinction between these two types of de-
cisions is robust and applicable not only to risk but
also to the case of uncertainty.
5 Further Considerations
We conclude by mentioning another issue that is
raised by our study, an issue that seems to have gen-
eral significance for experimental work on decision
making. An unusual aspect of the questionnaire that
we used in the study that is reported in Section 3 is
the fact that it is explicit about what is meant by
a random selection. While references to random se-
lection are common in experimental work on decision
making, these references are seldom accompanied by
something like the tutorial on fair chance setups that
was part of our study. It is natural to wonder if this
makes a difference. While we have yet to conduct
a study of this particular question, we do have data
from an earlier study that seems to suggest that it
does make a difference if one is explicit about what is
meant by a random selection.
As part of the study that we reported in [1], we used a
questionnaire that asked subjects to state their maxi-
mum buying price for what were essentially questions
Clear and Vague as presented in Section 3. It is impor-
tant to note that the questionnaire that was used in
[1] did not include any tutorial on fair chance setups,
nor for that matter did it include any elaboration re-
garding the nature of random selection. Finally, it
should be noted that the subjects in this earlier study
were, like those of the study reported in Section 3, un-
dergraduates at Carnegie Mellon who, at the time of
the study, were enrolled in 80-100, which as noted in
Section 3 is an introductory philosophy course. Table
6 shows the mean maximum buying prices for the two
groups in the earlier study that received Clear as the
first question on their questionnaire. 1
Group Mean for Clear (2005)
I 15.33
II 13.65
Table 6
These values seem significantly less than the mean
maximum buying prices for Clear that are reported
in Section 3. These differences seem striking when
one considers the mean maximum buying prices that
were obtained for Vague in the earlier study. Table 7
shows the mean maximum buying prices for the two
groups in the earlier study that received Vague as the
1The two groups were distinguished by the fact that they
were given slightly different questionnaires. Both groups re-
ceived a questionnaire that had Clear as the first question, but
there were some differences between the two questionnaires in
their later sections. We do not think that these differences are
significant in the present context, but the interested reader can
consult [1] for a detailed description of the questionnaires that
were involved.
first question on their questionnaire. 2
Group Mean for Vague (2005)
I 5.42
II 6.4
Table 7
These values seem more in line with the mean maxi-
mum buying prices for Vague that are reported in Sec-
tion 3. As a measure of this effect, Table 8 shows the
ratio of the mean maximum buying price for Vague
to that of Clear.
Group Vague/Clear
2005 .41
2008 .31
Table 8
Column 2 of the first row in Table 8 shows the average
of the two values reported in Table 7 divided by the
average of the two values reported in Table 6. The sec-
ond row of Table 8 shows the mean maximum buying
price for Vague as reported in Table 5 divided by the
mean maximum buying price for Clear as reported in
Table 5. Taken together, these further considerations
would seem to raise an important question as to how
subjects are interpreting references to random selec-
tion in those studies that do not elaborate on what is
meant by such a thing.
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